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1 INTRODUCTION 
Our modern society has come to depend on large-
scale critical infrastructures (CIs) to deliver re-
sources to consumers and businesses in an efficient 
manner. These CIs are complex networks of inter-
connected functional and structural elements. Large 
scale outages on these real-world complex networks, 
although infrequent, are increasingly disastrous to 
society, with estimates of direct costs up to billions 
of dollars and inestimable indirect costs. Typical ex-
amples include blackouts in power transmission 
networks (USCA 2004, UCTE 2007, Pidd 2012), fi-
nancial bankruptcy (Battiston et al. 2007), telecom-
munication outages (Newman et al. 2002), and cata-
strophic failures in socio-economic systems (Zhao 
2011 & Kempe 2003).  
Research regarding modeling, prediction and mit-
igation of cascading failure in complex networks has 
tried to address the problem with different aspects 
(Battiston et al. 2007, Newman et al. 2002, Zhao 
2011, Motter & Lai 2002, Dobson et al. 2004, 
Baldick et al. 2008).     
Albert et al. (2004) demonstrated that the vulnera-
bility of modern infrastructure networks (e.g., power 
transmission network) is inherent to their organiza-
tion. Thadakamalla et al. (2004) revealed that the to-
pology of a supply network has great impact on its 
resilience. In the renovation and re-design of CIs, a 
motivating objective should then be that of rendering 
them failure resilient, while operationally efficient 
(Boorstyn & Franck 1977). In literature, Shao et al. 
(2005) proposed the shrinking and searching algo-
rithm to maximize the network reliability of a dis-
tributed access network with constrained total cost. 
But the intense computation of network reliability 
prohibits its application to large size networks. 
Gutfraind (2010) introduced a multi-objective opti-
mization method for constructing cascade resilient 
networks based on the structure of terrorist networks. 
Newth & Ash (2004) used a modified Metropolis 
evolutionary algorithm to evolve failure resilient 
networks with the objective of maximizing the aver-
age network efficiency. 
In practical case, the cost of knocking down exist-
ing network and reconstructing it from scratch is 
prohibitive, especially for CIs like the power trans-
mission network. A more practicable alternative is to 
reconfigure a small part of the network topology, e.g. 
by reallocation the links between production facili-
ties and consumers.  
In this paper, a new efficiency index is proposed 
to characterize the dynamic supplying efficiency of a 
network where the consumer nodes receive re-
sources or services mostly from the nearest supply-
ing node in operation. Formulated as a large-scale, 
nonlinear and combinatorial multi-objective problem, 
the facility reallocation problem is solved by an evo-
lutionary algorithm, i.e., non-dominated sorting bi-
nary differential evolution (NSBDE) algorithm (Li 
et al. 2013).   
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. 
We formulate the multi-objective optimization mod-
el taking cost, network supplying efficiency and 
failure resilience into account in Section 2. Section 3 
unveils the detailed procedure of the proposed 
NSBDE algorithm. Section 4 illustrates the French 
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ABSTRACT: Large scale outages on real-world critical infrastructures (CIs), although infrequent, are increas-
ingly disastrous to society. In this paper, we model CIs as complex networks and consider the problem of  
facility allocation on nodes of the network for maximizing the efficiency of supply to other nodes and the re-
silience of the overall network in resisting to cascading failures. Of course, the investment costs for the allo-
cation must remain limited. The framework of facility allocation optimization is originally applied to the 
400kV French power transmission network, for allocating power generation to service the existing buses. The 
problem is combinatorial and multi-objective in nature, and for its solution we use the non-dominated sorting 
binary differential evolution (NSBDE) algorithm. 
400kV power transmission network case study and 
the results analysis. Conclusions and future work are 
drawn on the Section 5.  
2 OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
2.1 Network model 
We represent a complex supply network as a 
weighted undirected graph  comprising a set 
of nodes   	AB AC D  AEF together with a set of 
edges   	B C D  F. The network nodes are 
generally classified into facility supplying nodes 
and resources consuming nodes  (    ); 
we use  and  to indicate the cardinalities of  and , respectively. The structure of the net-
work is identified by an   interaction matrix , whose element  is 0 if node  and  are not 
connected directly; otherwise it is assigned a numer-
ical weight by the physical distance between  and, 
which we assume directly related to the transmitting 
cost of the link. 
We define the variables to be optimized as the 
links of facility allocation to the different consuming 
nodes: 



=
otherwise ,0
directly  with connected is  if ,1 ji
ijX         (1) 
for all    and   .  
A cost is associated with each rewiring. We as-
sume that the cost is linearly proportional to the 
physical length of the linkage with a coefficient . 
Besides, two constraints have to be met when reallo-
cating the facilities: (1) each consumer node is re-
quired to connect with at least one facility node or 
other consumer node, to make it accessible to the 
supplying facilities; (2) each facility node has to 
connect at least with one consumer node. 
2.2 Network supplying efficiency 
Notions of network supplying efficiency attempt to 
quantify the value of a network in operating its ser-
vice. A well-known measure of network efficiency 
is a version of distance-based efficiency (Latora & 
Marchiori 2001). For its compotation all pairs of 
nodes i , and j  are weighted by the inverse 
of the distance: 

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where    is the number of edges for un-
weighted network or the sum of edge weights for 
weighted network in the shortest path from i to j. 
This definition is able to partially characterize the 
topological property of a complex network. To eval-
uate the dynamic supplying efficiency of a network 
where the consumer nodes receive resources or ser-
vice mostly from the nearest supplying node in op-
eration, a new index is here proposed: 
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where  is characterized by the most efficient sup-
plying channel from all the facility nodes to con-
sumer node j. Similarly we have the following glob-
al network supplying efficiency by averaging across 
all the consumer nodes: 

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It is noted that    always holds.    
2.3 Cascading failure model and network 
vulnerability 
There is extensive literature on cascading failure 
models of complex networks (e.g., Newman et al. 
2002, Kempe 2003, Motter & Lai 2002, Dobson et 
al. 2004, Baldick et al. 2008, Motter 2004, Vaiman 
et al. 2012). Two basic types are considered: perco-
lation cascades and capacity cascades. The former 
originate in Physics but is often applied to Epidemi-
ology, where it is termed “contagious” or “epidem-
ics” (see, e.g. Newman 2003). The capacity cascades 
usually applies to a capacitated network such as a 
power transmission system and supply chain, in 
which edges carry flows from facility nodes to con-
sumer nodes. Cascades occur when initial failures of 
a part cause flows redistribution, overloading anoth-
er part and causing it to fail as well, prompting addi-
tional parts to fail in a vicious cycle. The capacity 
cascading failure model is the focus in this study. 
Following the work in Motter & Lai 2002, for a 
given supply network, suppose that at each time step 
one unit of the relevant quantity, which can be in-
formation, energy, etc., is exchanged between every 
pair of facility nodes and consumer nodes and 
transmitted along the shortest path connecting them. 
The load (or stress) at one node is then the number 
of shortest paths passing through it. More precisely, 
the load !" of node k is quantified by the node be-
tweenness calculated as the fraction of the facility-
consumer shortest paths passing through that node: 
 ≠≠∈∈∈= kjiVkCVjSVj ijn
kijn
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where # is the number of shortest paths between 
facility nodes and consumer nodes, and #$ is 
the number of facility-consumer shortest paths pass-
ing though node k.  
The capacity of node k is assumed to be propor-
tional to its initial node !" with a network tolerance 
parameter ,  
kLkC )1( α+=                              (6) 
The concept of tolerance parameter  ( > 0) could 
be regarded as an operating margin allowing safe 
operation of the component under potential load in-
crement. The occurrence of a cascading failure is 
initiated by removal of a node, which in general 
changes the distribution of shortest paths. Then the 
load at a particular node can change and if it in-
creases and exceeds its capacity, the corresponding 
node fails. Any failure leads to a new redistribution 
of loads and, as a result, subsequent failures can oc-
cur.  
Using this cascading failure model, the vulnerabil-
ity of network G can be characterized by the fraction 
of network efficiency loss in a cascading failure: 
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where Vul(G) %& and ' represents the residu-
al network structure after a cascading failure. It 
should be noted that the effect of the type of initial 
event could be significant to the cascading failure 
result: the loss of a cascade triggered by the failure 
of a critical component could be much more severe 
than that originated by the failure of a normal com-
ponent. Therefore, we consider the worst-case sce-
narios in this study, i.e. one of the top five most 
loaded (largest betweenness) nodes, is chosen to fail 
in each cascading simulation, and the result is aver-
aged on a number of simulations. 
The detailed simulation of a cascading failure pro-
ceeds as follows: 
Step 1. Apply formula (5) to compute the initial load 
of each node for a proposed network by Floyd’s 
shortest paths algorithm (Floyd 1962), and calculate 
the capacity of each node based on formula (6).  
Step 2. The most loaded node is chosen as failed and 
thus is removed from the network.  
Step 3. Recur to formula (5) and Floyd’s shortest 
paths algorithm to recalculate the load of each work-
ing node in the network. 
Step 4. Test each node for failure: for each node k 
(k ) of the network, if !" ( )" then node k is 
regarded as failed and thus is removed. 
Step 5. If any working node fails, return back to step 
3. Otherwise, terminate the cascading simulation. 
2.4 Multi-objective optimization problem 
formulation 
After quantifying the cost, network efficiency and 
cascading failure vulnerability, the facility allocation 
problem is formulated as a multi-objective optimiza-
tion as: 
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 The objective function (8a) is the sum of the fixed 
rewiring costs; (8b) and (8c) express the operating 
efficiency and resilience objectives, respectively. 
The two constraints mentioned in Section 2.1 are en-
forced by formula (8e) and (8f), respectively. 
Observe that the least costly facility allocation is 
simply that when there is no link between facilities 
and consumers.    
3 NON-DOMINATED SORTING BINARY 
DIFFERENTIAL EVOLUTION ALGORITHM 
In this section, we briefly introduce the operation 
procedures of the NSBDE algorithm. The standard 
differential evolution (DE) algorithm, initially pro-
posed as a population-based global optimization 
method for real-valued optimization problems, has 
been found to outperform alternative optimization 
algorithms in various fields (Li et al. 2013, Price et 
al. 2005, Ponsich & Coello 2011). In order to solve 
the combinatorial multi-objective problem of inter-
est, the fast non-dominated sorting, ranking and elit-
ism techniques used in non-dominated sorting genet-
ic algorithm-II (NSGA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) is 
introduced into a modified binary differential evolu-
tion (MBDE) which is a binary version of DE devel-
oped to tackle single-objective binary-coded optimi-
zation problems (Wang et al. 2010). The NSBDE 
proceeds as follows (Li et al. 2013): 
Step 1. Initialization of parameters 
Set the values of the population size NP, the crosso-
ver rate CR, the scaling factor F, and the maximum 
generations Nmax. 
Step 2. Generation of initial population and evalua-
tion 
Initialize each individual in the population which is 
represented as a bit-string and denoted as *+, 	*+,  -*+,  	%&F.   &/ D 0   &/ D 1F , 
where NP is the population size and M is the dimen-
sionality of the solutions. Each individual is also 
called a chromosome and forms a candidate solution 
to the problem. Each bit of each initial chromosome 
takes a value from the set {0, 1} with probability 
equals to 0.5: the bit takes ‘1’ if the corresponding 
facility node and consumer node are connected, ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
Each of the NP chromosomes is evaluated by 
computing the three objective functions, i.e. formula 
(8a), (8b) and (8c) on its corresponding network to-
pology. 
Step 3. Generation of trial population 
Apply the binary tournament selection operator (Deb 
et al. 2002) to the population 02, to generate a trial 
population 0,, which undergoes the evolution op-
erations of mutation and crossover. 
Step 3.1 Mutation 
The following probability estimation operator 
P(px) is utilized to generate the mutated individu-
als according to the information of the parent 
population: 
03*+, 4  B
B567
89:;<=>?@ ABC;<=8?@ 7;<=D?@ E7FGHI>A8B
     (9) 
where b is a positive real constant, usually set as 
6; F is the scaling factor; *+JB, , *+JC,  and *+JK,  are the j-th bits of three randomly chosen 
individuals at generation t. According to the prob-
ability estimation vector 0*+,  :*+B,  *+C,  D *+E, I created by Eq. (9), the corresponding off-
spring *L, of the current target individual *+, 
is generated as Eq. (10). 
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where rand is a uniformly distributed random 
number within the interval [0,1]. 
Step 3.2 Crossover 
The crossover operator is used to mix the target 
individual and its mutated individual. The trial in-
dividual *A,  *AB,  *AC,  D  *AE,   can be 
obtained by the crossover operator as follows, 
*A,  M*L
,  NOPQ# R )STU  PQ#
*+,  TVWXUYNZX  (11) 
where randj %&I is a uniform random value, 
CR is the crossover rate, and randi is a uniform 
discrete random number in the set {1, 2, ..., NP}. 
Step 4. Evaluation 
Evaluate each of the NP chromosomes in the popu-
lation 0,  by computing its rewiring cost (8a), 
network supplying efficiency (8c) and its resilience 
to cascading failures (8b) by performing the cascade 
process simulation procedure presented in Section 
2.3.  
Step 5. Union and Sorting 
Combine the parent and trial populations to obtain a 
union population 0[,  02,  0,. Rank the in-
dividuals in the union population by the fast non-
dominated sorting algorithm (Deb et al. 2002) with 
respect to the objective values, and identify the 
ranked non-dominated fronts F1, F2, …, Fk where F1 
is the best front, F2 is the second best front and Fk 
the least good front. 
Step 6. Selection 
Select the first NP individuals from 0[, to create a 
new parent population 02,5B. The crowding dis-
tance is used in this step to choose the individuals 
with the same front, where crowing refers to the 
density of solution present in a neighborhood of an 
individual of specified radius (Deb et al. 2002). We 
prefer the individual which is located in a region 
with least number of individuals. The algorithm 
stops when it reaches the predefined maximum gen-
erations Nmax.   
4 CASE STUDY AND RESULTS ANALYSES 
In this paper, the 400kV French power transmission 
network (Figure 1) is taken for exemplification of 
the proposed approach. The network is built from 
the data on the 400 kV transmission lines of the RTE 
website (RTE 2011). It has 171 nodes (substations) 
and 220 edges (transmission lines). We distinguish 
the generators, which are the source of power, from 
the other distribution substations, that receive power 
and transmit it to other substations or distribute it in 
local distribution grids. By obtaining the power 
plants list from the EDF website (EDF 2013) and re-
lating them with the ID of the buses in the transmis-
sion network, we have 26 generators and 145 dis-
tributors. Only the nuclear power plants, hydraulic 
plants and thermal power plants whose installed ca-
pacities are larger than 1000 MW, are considered. 
For reallocation of the power generating nodes 
(facilities) to the other nodes (consumers), the 
NSBDE algorithm is applied. The parameters used 
to run the NSBDE algorithm are reported in Table 1. 
The network tolerance parameter  is set as 0.3; 
linkage cost parameter  is set as 1 in the experi-
ment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  The parameters of the NSBDE algorithm. 
______________________________________________ 
Parameters         Values 
______________________________________________ 
Population size NP      25 
Dimensionality of solution M  3770 
Crossover rate CR      0.9 
Scaling factor F       0.2 
Maximum generation Nmax    500 
_____________________________________________ 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 reports the convergence plots of one exper-
iment run of the NSBDE algorithm. The three panels 
show the three optimal solutions with regard to the 
three objectives, respectively. It is observed that the 
algorithm is able to converge after about 250 genera-
tions. 
The Pareto dominance front obtained by the 
NSBDE algorithm at convergence is illustrated in 
the 3-D space of Figure 3(a). The three 2-D projec-
tions of the solutions are shown in Figure 3(b), 3(c) 
and 3(d), respectively. The square point in Figure 4 
represents the true network with the links at present, 
which is also the least costly network; the star point 
is the most resilient network, whose cascading vul-
nerability is 0.074, and the diamond point represents 
the network of most supplying efficient, 0.204. It is 
not unexpected that the original network is the least 
costly one, since the electrical transmission lines and 
substations are placed with geographical constraint 
and connections between two distant substations are 
avoided in. 
Figure 3(c) shows that the cascading resilience of 
the 400kV French power transmission network is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The 400kV French power transmission network 
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Figure 2. The convergence plots of objective finesses 
during the evolution of NSBDE 
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improved significantly by properly rewiring the gen-
erator-distributor connections, though at a cost; the 
network vulnerability is decreased from 0.728 to 
0.074 (when =1.3) with an increased average cost 
of &G\  &%]. Figure 4 reports the cascading vulner-
ability comparison between the original network and 
the most resilient one with different tolerance pa-
rameters. It shows that when the network tolerance 
is very low, i.e. 0<<0.1, the optimized network los-
es most of its efficiency, i.e., it is quite vulnerable to 
targeted attacks. However, when  0.3 (which is 
generally the normal operating condition Baldick 
2008), the optimized network loses less than 10% of 
its efficiency during a cascading failure initiated by 
intentional attack. 
The inner figure of Figure 4 shows that the con-
nection of the most resilient network is much denser 
than the original network. Given that it is not easy to 
realize a physical connection between two distant 
substations, a careful trade-off between cost and 
cascading resilient improvement should be taken in-
to account by the decision makers. 
 It is noted from Figure 3(d) that the supplying ef-
ficiency of the network can also be increased, alt-
hough in a limited range. According to its definition 
in Eq. (4), one cannot improve the supplying effi-
ciency any more as long as a distributor has con-
nected with its nearest generator, which is normally 
the case for most of the distributors in the real net-
work. Therefore, we remove the supplying efficien-
cy objective, i.e. keep only the network resilience 
and cost objectives for the optimization. . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 compares the Pareto fronts obtained by 
two-objectives (reallocation cost and cascading resil-
ience) and three-objective (reallocation cost, supply-
ing efficiency and cascading resilience) NDBDE op-
timization in the cascading vulnerability-cost space. 
The parameter settings of the two-objective optimi-
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Figure 3. Pareto front in 3-D space and its 2-D projections 
reached by a population of 25 chromosomes evolving for 500 
generations 
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Figure 4. Comparison of the cascading vulnerability between 
the original and the most resilient networks under different net-
work tolerance 
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Figure 5. Comparison of the Pareto dominance fronts be-
tween three and two objectives optimization 
zation are of the same as for the three-objective op-
timization. One can find that the solutions from two-
objective optimization are obviously better than 
those of three-objective optimization.  
Figure 6 reports the comparison of the topology of 
the original network and a network corresponding to 
a two-objective optimization solution (310.6, 0.59) 
when =1.3. The links difference between the two 
networks is 10, i.e. only 10 links are required to be 
rewired for the original network to gain a 19.2% 
cascading resilience improvement (the cascading 
vulnerability is decreased from 0.73 to 0.59). Be-
sides, the optimized network gains a slight supplying 
efficiency improvement, i.e. from 0.0184 to 0.0186.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned before, a tradeoff between the cost 
and resilience improvement should be taken into ac-
count in decision-making. Along the Pareto frontier 
of the potential solutions, there are some points at 
which a small sacrifice of cost gives a large gain of 
cascading resilience. More generally, by taking a 
network solution and its neighbor on the frontier (the 
less costly one), one can define a rate of change of 
cascading resilience with respect to cost: -^L_`^abcd-. This rate can be utilized as a reference to 
choose the optimized network: the larger the ratio, 
the more preferred the network is. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In many CIs, the structure emerges through an un-
planned growth process to meet service demand 
and/or results from optimization of costs. However, 
the increasing threat of large scale failures makes it 
vital to think of the design of resilient network sys-
tems capable to resist against and recover from cas-
cading failures.  
In this paper, the problem of allocating of produc-
tion facilities to consumers nodes by rewiring links 
has been considered under the objectives of maxim-
izing the network cascading failure resilience and 
supplying efficiency, while maintaining the invest-
ment costs limited. Exemplification has been done 
by taking the 400kV French power transmission 
network as an illustration. In realistic cases of net-
works connecting a large number of nodes, the prob-
lem is a combinatorial multi-objective optimization 
problem. We effectively tackled this by the proposed 
NSBDE multi-objective algorithm, within a Pareto 
optimality scheme of search for non-dominated solu-
tions. The results of the case study show that facility 
allocation can be optimized to improve the cascad-
ing resilience of a supplying network system at an 
acceptable cost.  
The analysis performed focuses only on the topo-
logical and geographical distance features of the 
network, thus neglecting important physical charac-
teristics like: (i) the “electrical” length of a path dif-
fers from the topological, depending on the difficul-
ty (impedance for high voltage transmission lines) of 
transmission; (ii) the electrical power flow is not 
necessarily routed through the shortest path; rather 
the transmission of power is completely determined 
by physical rules, e.g., Kirchoff's laws, nodal voltag-
es etc. (iii) the capacity of electrical generation and 
the amount of local consumption are heterogonous 
for different components in the power transmission 
network. Establishing effective ways of bringing 
these physical characteristics into the topological 
analysis forms the possible future work in this thread 
of investigation. 
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